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The Allocation of Energy Resources in the 
Very Long Run1 
 
Roger Fouquet 




This paper investigates the Nordhaus (1973) model developed to understand how markets 
allocate energy resources. In particular, the model proposes that royalties earned by non-
renewable energy producers are closely related to the cost of the backstop energy source, 
the interest rate and the switching date to the backstop energy source. Here, the paper 
presents the prices of the main and backstop energy sources, extraction costs and royalties, 
as well as transport costs, taxes and interest rates, over more than five hundred years in 
Britain to test the model’s ability to explain very long run market behavior. While the 
model needs a more rigorous analysis, the very long run data and this crude test suggests 
that certain episodes might be explained by the model and that others do not appear to be. 
Also, each of the three explanatory variables do appear to be relevant in these explained 
episodes. In general, though, energy markets appear to be myopic, unaware of the limits of 
the non-renewable resource being traded, and only in moments of crisis do they consider 
the finiteness of the resource and, then, perhaps too dramatically, triggering major new 
technological, infrastructure and R&D investments.  
 
Published as: Fouquet, R. (2015) ‘The allocation of energy resources in the very long run.’ 
Journal of Natural Resource Policy Research (Special Issue on William Nordhaus) 7(2-3) 
147-156. 
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1. Introduction 
A central concern to energy economists in the 1970s was the threat of energy 
resource limits to economic growth. William Nordhaus’ (1973) article on The 
Allocation of Energy Resources was one of the finest and grandest examples of this 
effort to understand how an economy can continue to grow despite limited fossil 
fuel resources.  
Strongly influenced by his supervisor Robert Solow (1974), William Nordhaus 
became highly proficient at developing “small models applied to real problems, 
blending real-world observation and a little mathematics to cut through to the core 
of an issue.” (Krugman 2014). Shortly after he completed his PhD in 1967, energy 
economics began to benefit from the skills and imagination of this innovative 
researcher coming out of the golden age of MIT’s PhD programme.  
This is particularly interesting, since he had identified the crucial role energy 
played in the economy before the oil price hike of 1973. Naturally, other scholars 
had already alerted economists and the world of this role – particularly Mori 
Adelmann (1972) at MIT, Sam Schurr and his colleagues (Schurr and Netschert 
1960) at Resources for the Future, and, of course, the ‘Limits to Growth’ team 
(Meadows et al. 1972). Yet, just as he pre-empted the importance of the economics 
of climate change and of technological development (Nordhaus 1977, 1991, 1997), 
he was at the right place, at the right time.  
As his research assistant on the project, Paul Krugman offered some insight into 
the evolution of the paper. “The first summer I worked for him, Nordhaus began 
with only a vague sense of how to think about the problem of appropriate pricing 
of energy. I was able to watch the process by which he crystallized that vague 
sense into a model, and then was able to see the way in which that model 
transformed everyone's perception of the issue.” (Krugman 2014). 
Nordhaus (1973) was interested in identifying how energy resources would be 
allocated, both positively and normatively. In other words, first, how do markets 
allocate energy resources? As he said “[i]t takes an act of faith to believe that "the 
market" can somehow see the proper allocation through this tangle of complexity, 
uncertainty, and politics” (Nordhaus 1973 p.538). And, second, how energy 
resources should be allocated? Always the pragmatist, he tried to provide “a middle 
ground between .. summon[ing] … all current and future citizens … into Yankee 
Stadium” (Nordhaus 1973 p.538) to decide on how to allocate resources and 
developing a model that forecasts all present and future prices. Indeed, his model 
offered a very long run perspective, looking 200 years into the future. 
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Given his very long run perspective, this special issue offers an opportunity to 
examine the Nordhaus’ (1973) framework and comment on how energy markets 
have allocated resources in the very long run. Therefore, the focus in this paper is 
to look at backstop energy resources, extraction costs and royalties, as well as 
transport costs, taxes and interest rates, over more than five hundred years in 
Britain. The focus is on coal markets from the thirteenth century until the mid-
twentieth century, because they provide a case study in which governments had 
limited influence over prices, and markets dominated the allocation of energy 
resources. This data analysis provides a crude test of his model.    
This brief historical analysis builds on and greatly extends a discussion in Fouquet 
(2011a) on long run energy prices. For those interested in the sources of the data 
presented in this paper, the extensive data collection exercise by Thorold Rogers 
(1865–86) on agricultural prices in market towns across England provided 
indicators of the cost of fuels as far back as the eleventh century. William 
Beveridge (1894) then gathered reliable data from the sixteenth century onwards, 
creating long run series reflecting the price of energy faced by individual 
institutions. The institutions included some of the Oxford and Cambridge colleges, 
the Eton and Westminster Colleges and the Navy, as well as long-standing 
hospitals. They have been combined to get an average price of individual fuels in 
Southern England, where most of the institutions were based. Gregory Clark 
(2010) has recently added to the data sets. All the costs and prices are converted 
into values in the year 2000 using the price index data from Allen (2007). 
2. Backstop and Non-Renewable Energy Sources  
Nordhaus (1973) presented a model of a relatively cheap non-renewable resource 
and an abundant but expensive backstop technology – he proposed either a fast 
breeder or fusion nuclear power source2. For much of its history, the backstop 
energy source in Britain was woodfuel. Although limited in England and, to a 
lesser extent, in Wales and Scotland, it could also be imported from overseas. It 
effectively was between 1650 and 1800, since England and Wales imported two-
thirds of its bar iron from Sweden and Russia (King 2006). At the height of 
imports, in the 1780s, the 50,000 tonnes of bar iron imported into England and 
Wales would have required 170,000 tonnes of charcoal and coppiced woods 
equivalent to 3% of England’s surface area (Fouquet 2008 p.60).  
Naturally, there was a limit to the abundance of this backstop energy source, 
especially when considering the demands of a global economy. However, until the 
                                                          
2 The former is still seen as very expensive forty years later, while the latter cannot realistically be 
considered one, due to current scientific and engineering limitations.   
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twentieth century, Britain could have considered woodfuel a genuine backstop 
energy source. Between 1700 and 1900, total energy consumption increased 
sixteen-fold (from 1.4 to 22.2 million tonnes of oil equivalent), which could have 
been supplied to a large extent by imports of fuelwood, charcoal or the goods 
produced from these fuels. After all, Sweden was 9 times larger than England, and 
Russia was 340 times larger. Clearly, the rising prices from using woodfuels would 
have greatly reduced energy consumption and impeded economic growth and 
development, but it was a more realistic backstop energy source then than nuclear 
fusion or even probably fast breeder reactors are today (Hatcher 1993).      
Nordhaus (1973 p.533) explains that, for a non-renewable resource, “[t]here are 
three important elements in determining current royalty …: the cost of the backstop 
technology, the interest rate, and the switch date.” Figure 1 presents the prices of 
both the backstop, charcoal, and the non-renewable energy source, coal. In the 
fourteenth century, the dominant source was the backstop energy source, because 
coal markets and technologies had not yet been fully developed. The rising 
population placed significant pressures on woodfuel and charcoal prices. After the 
Black Death, and the near halving of the population, woodfuel prices dropped. 






Figure 1. Average Charcoal and Coal Prices in England, 1300-2000 
 5 
 
In sixteenth century England, the introduction of grates for burning coal and 
chimneys to externalize emissions enabled households in urban areas to switch 
from woodfuels to coal. The experience of the 1300s suggests that woodfuel prices 
would have increased a great deal further in the sixteenth century (above 
£(2000)300) without the slow transition towards coal for residential heating 
demands (Fouquet 2010). Similarly, in a number of industries, methods were 
developed to use coal rather than charcoal – although it took until the eighteenth 
century for adequate and affordable techniques to be developed in the large iron 
industry.  
The transition from woofuels and other biomass sources to coal took roughly three 
hundred years. In 1700, coal already provided 73% of all primary (non-
agricultural) energy consumption. By 1800, its share had reached 95%. King Coal 
was at the heart of British economic growth (Flinn 1984).  
Reflecting this transition, the prices of charcoal and of coal varied considerably. In 
the seventeenth century, the differential between the two prices was certainly 
increasing, with the former triple the latter. But, in the eighteenth century, the gap 
was closing; by 1800, there was less than 50% difference in prices. According to 
Nordhaus (1973) model, this should have been captured in higher royalties for the 
producers (see below).     
3. Long Run Trend in Taxes and Transport Costs 
In the Introduction, it was proposed that governments had little influence over coal 
markets. While this is broadly true, the government did alter the course of price 
trends by introducing and varying the tax facing many consumers in Britain. 
Certainly, average coal prices appear to have risen between 1600 and 1800, and the 
main explanation for this rise in coal prices to the consumer from the late 1600s 
(see Figure 1 and 2) was the introduction of taxes on coal to pay for wars. The tax 
stood at an average of 12% between 1691 and 1697, and then increased to 33% in 
1698, peaking at 38% from 1714 to 1758, varying between 29% and 34% 
throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, and then dropping to 15% in 
1816, after the Battle of Waterloo. In 1831, national duties on coal were removed, 
although modest local taxes of about 5% remained until 1903 (Hausman 1987 
p.592). Therefore, average consumer coal prices increased as consumption grew, 
reflecting the government´s ability to capture some of the consumer surplus 
associated with a relatively inelastic demand. 
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Figure 2 presents more detailed trends in coal prices over seven hundred years in 
England. It shows prices in London, in England (on average) and in the North-East 
(without the tax). From 1500, coal prices in the North of England stayed close to 
£40 (in 2000 values) per tonne for three hundred years. Removing the taxes from 
the average England and London series creates three parallel trends, indicating the 
cost of distributing coal around the country. The average English transport costs of 
coal were 60% of the untaxed value from the 1300 until about 1700. In other 
words, transport costs (and middlemen) were a large component of the price faced 
by the consumer. 
From the beginning of the eighteenth century, transport costs fell to about 45%. 
They dropped substantially as a result of the expansion of canals, especially in 
certain regions (such as South Wales, East Midlands and Lancashire (Turnbull 
1987 p.549)). Others benefitted from improving coastal trade (Ville 1986). London 
prices were consistently about 10% higher than the average and, there, reductions 
in distribution costs only occurred from the 1790s. Then, from the 1840s, and the 
advent of the railways, coal prices across England fell towards the price paid in the 










Figure 2. Pithead and Regional Coal Prices in England, 1300-2000 
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4. Long Run Trends in Extraction Costs  
In analyzing non-renewable resource prices, Nordhaus (1973 p.531) 
“distinguish[ed] between extraction costs, the vector z(t), or the marginal cost per 
unit of output excluding rents and royalties; and royalties, the vector y(t), which are 
a reflection of the presumed scarcity of a particular resource.”. From 1600, there 
was data on pithead prices, which acts as an indicator of the extraction costs (see 
Figure 2). The trend was generally flat (in the $20-$30 per tonne of oil equivalent 
range) from the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century, which is 
impressive given that coal mines had to be dug deeper to meet rapidly growing 
demands. In fact, there were declines in extraction costs in the second half of the 
seventeenth and of the eighteenth centuries – although prices gravitated back to the 
$20-$30 range. The latter period probably reflected the ability to use early steam 
engines to pump water out of the deeper mines. Thus, for three hundred years, the 
greater difficulties of extraction were balanced-out by improvements in technical 
ingenuity. 
It also indicated that until the end of the nineteenth century, there was an elastic 
supply of labor. In 1913, the peak year of coal production in Britain, there were one 
million coal miners – 7% of the male work force was extracting coal. However, 
from the 1870s until the 1920s, miners’ strikes signalled the demands for higher 
wages and better working conditions – there were more than 2,200 coal-mining 
related deaths in 1913 (Fouquet 2011b). British mines became more mechanized, 
but overall production costs rose substantially, because coal mines still needed 
many workers and could never be completely mechanized (see Figure 1). More 
generally, one can can expect that where substitutability between capital and labor 
is limited for technical reasons, as in coal mines, the trend in extraction costs will 
tend to increase, as the economy develops (Ayres and Warr 2009). In other words, 
if energy is fuelling economic growth and development, then, wages will rise, thus, 
so will labor costs and, ultimately, energy prices. 
5. Long Run Trends in Royalties 
Having a proxy for extraction costs (i.e., pithead prices) and prices near the mines 
(e.g., the North East of England) in Figure 2, it is possible to estimate a crude 
indicator of royalties. As mentioned, between 1500 and 1800, coal prices in North 
East England stabilized around $40 per tonne of oil equivalent. Thus, given that 
extraction costs were in the $20-$30 range, the royalties were roughly one quarter 
to one half of the costs – though this does ignore (presumably modest) local supply 
costs. Then, from just before 1800, they increased dramatically.  
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Nordhaus (1973 p.534) explains “… if the interest rate is high, then the royalty on 
energy resources is relatively low. Conversely, if these conditions are reversed, the 
royalty on energy resources is high”. Looking at the last 250 years, for which real 
interest rates exist, Figure 3 suggests that this relationship seems to hold in a few 
historical periods, but is far from the norm. For instance, in the late eighteenth 
century, 10-year average real interest rates fell from 4% to 0% and royalties 
jumped from 40% to almost 70%. Then, around 1800, real interest rates rose again 
and royalties declined. However, for much of the nineteenth century, there is little 
correlation. And, then, from 1880, the opposite occurs, and the two variables 
appear to be positively correlated – real interest rates drop from 4% to 2% and then 
fall into negative values during the First World War, and royalties on coal seem to 
follow. Then, from 1950, the negative relationship seems to return. Real interest 
rates jumped from -2% to 2%, and royalties fell to 20%. In 1965, real interest rates 
drop back down to -2% and royalties bounce back to 60%. However, this was also 
a period of heavy government intervention, and institutional factors might have 
played a stronger role than interest rates in determining royalties. Overall, the 
historical evidence is inconclusive, and a more thorough econometric analysis 
would be required to discern the influence of interest rates on royalties and, thus, 
on trends in coal prices.   
Royalties
Real    
Interest Rates
Source: Royalties: see Figure 2; Interest Rates: Officer (2012); Allen (2007) – 10-year average.
 




More importantly, as Nordhaus (1973) emphasized, royalties reflected resource 
scarcity. He proposed that the “switch date” - that is, the year in which the 
economy has to make the transition to the abundant, but expensive backstop energy 
source - imposes upward pressure on royalties and, therefore, prices. The sooner 
the date at which the economy needs to begin the transition to the backstop energy 
source, the higher will be the price.  
So, when was the perceived switch date? As a young economist, William Stanley 
Jevons (1865) made his name by effectively asking this question. He famously 
proposed the paradox that efficiency improvements would lead to an increase in 
coal consumption, rather than a decrease, because of what is now known as the 
‘rebound effect’ (Madureira 2012). He combined this idea with long run 
projections of British population and economic growth to forecast coal 
consumption over the next one hundred years – which he proposed would grow by 
3.5% per year, reaching 2.6 billion tons in 1961 (Jevons 1865 XII.23) – equivalent 
to 1.6 billion tonnes of oil
3
. Jevons estimated that, at this growth rate, the country 
would consume roughly 100 billion tons of coal between 1860 and 1960. However, 
he also used geological estimates of coal reserves to indicate that, at that rate, 
Britain’s main fuel would disappear in 80 years (Madureira 2012 p.410).  
Two years before, an industrialist, William George Armstrong, had already made a 
forecast, using more simple linear assumptions about consumption patterns, that 
Britain’s coal reserves would last 212 years (Madureira 2012 p.410). Two years 
before that, in 1861, the geologist Edward Hull “had estimated the recoverable 
resources as assessed by the Geological Survey for England, Wales and Scotland 
amounted to about 80,000 million tons of coal, which, at the rate of production in 
the late 1850s, would last for 1,100 years.” (Madureira 2012 p.403). Thus, the 
markets might have believed that the switch date to a backstop energy source had 
fallen from 1,100 years (in the future) in 1861 to 80 years in 1865. It may be a 
coincidence, but royalties increased from around 40% of the pre-tax price in 1857 
to 70% in 1872.   
Certainty, just as the US has been concerned about oil supplies since the 1970s, 
British industrialists and politicians were fearful about dwindling coal reserves in 
the mid-nineteenth century. As Figure 4 shows, the (25-year average) growth rate 
                                                          
3 Out of interest, United Kingdom’s peak year of coal consumption was 1913, reaching 160 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent, which was 50% of the Jevons’ forecast for 1913 and 10% of the Jevons’ 
peak (i.e. 1961) forecast. Nevertheless, he was partially correct about the impact of rebound effects on 
energy consumption, although only for a few decades in the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Fouquet 2014).   
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of British GDP, which had been fuelled by deeper and longer coal mines, had been 
accelerating since the 1750s. “British leaders viewed the linkage between coal and 
the empire as the mainstay of their strategic clout, which was then consolidated 
through trade networks, industrial advantage, shipbuilding industries and naval 
power. More than a commodity, what was at stake was a string of economic 
interdependencies with repercussions for the British way of life. There was such 
anxiety about coal’s interlocking effects that the slightest sign of disturbance could 
escalate into sweeping policy issues. Irrespective of the different political positions 
of economists and geologists, they both shared the view that industrial ascendancy 
and world supremacy was closely bound up with coal.” Madureira (2012 p.419). 
Royalties
GDP Growth 
Source: Royalties: see Figure 2; GDP: Broadberry et al. (2015).
 
Figure 4. Royalties on Coal Prices and GDP Growth Rates (25-year average) 
in England/Britain/United Kingdom, 1600-2010 
 
Royalties peaked in the mid-1880s at 75% of the pre-tax price, which coincided 
with the peak of British long-run average GDP growth rate (see Figure 4). Both, 
the growth rate and royalties fell a little over the next thirty years. Then, as 
economic growth rates collapsed, royalties fell from 65% in 1913 to 42% in 1919. 
Afterwards, the British economy was no longer as fundamentally tied to coal, and 
royalties fell to 20%. Coal was no longer king in Britain, and was no longer scarce 
(Church 1987).  
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6. Conclusion 
Given the growing concern about the ability for economies to continue to grow 
despite limited fossil fuel reserves, William Nordhaus (1973) sought to ask ‘how 
do markets allocate energy resources?’ and ‘how can energy resources be allocated 
efficiently?’ The purpose of this paper was to offer a crude test of the model he 
developed to answer the first question. The model is tested by using energy prices 
over more than five hundred years. 
The model is based on the relationship between royalties associated with the 
production of a non-renewable energy resource and (i) the cost of the backstop 
energy source, (ii) the interest rate and (iii) the switching date to the backstop 
energy source. Although elegant and simple, a general weakness of the model is 
that, both to the market and to the analyst, a backstop technology may not be 
clearly identified. As a result, the cost and the switching date may be highly 
uncertain.  
Despite this general limitation, for the history of Britain, it was possible to identify 
a backstop energy source, woodfuel (i.e., firewood and charcoal), which could have 
been an expensive alternative to coal. For most of the period, there is little evidence 
of concern for the switching date to the backstop. However, a fear of running-out 
of coal did take hold of Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. This was a 
remarkable period of one hundred years of accelerating economic growth rates and 
popular fears of resource scarcity developed. In turn, the markets translated this 
fear into a dramatic increase in royalties, though with more ambiguous effects on 
national average coal prices. Nevertheless, this led to the discovery of new coal 
reserves, new methods of extraction, more efficient ways of consuming energy and, 
ultimately, substitutes for coal, in the form of new energy sources (such oil, gas 
and electricity) rather than the backstop technology. It ultimately led to the gradual 
decline of coal use in Britain, perhaps like the energy crisis in the 1970s was a 
signal of the beginning of a gradual decline of oil use in industrialised economies.  
This paper only offered a crude attempt to test the Nordhaus (1973) model of 
resource allocation – and the model needs and deserves a more rigorous analysis. 
The general impression the very long run data and this crude test provided was that 
energy markets tend to be myopic, unaware of the limits of the non-renewable 
resource being traded and of a backstop technology. Only in moments of crisis 
does it consider the finiteness of the resource and, then, perhaps too dramatically, 
triggering major new technological, infrastructure and R&D investments. Yet, 
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